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INTRODUCTION

The last Reagan appointee to the United States Supreme
Court was Anthony M. Kennedy. Formerly a judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy was appointed by
President Ford. He was also a member of a special California
commission appointed by Governor Reagan to draft Proposition
1 to reduce state spending. Justice Kennedy has strong ties
with the Republican party, but conservatives as well as
liberals had questions as to what Kennedy would actually do
once on the Supreme Court. Charles F. Williams writing for
the ABA Journal

suggested that the Senate was pleased with

Kennedy because he was not the ideologue that Bork was. 1
Kennedy"s lack of identifiable ideology was one of the main
factors that got him appointed to the Court. First, it
allowed the Senate Judiciary Committee to come to a
compromise. 2 Second, i t would allow the Senators to explain
why they had voted for him in the event that he might decide
cases unfavorably. The senators could say, "'Hey, I didn"t
know that he was going to vote that way. " .. 3 They wanted a
justice who appeared middle-of-the-road, and numerous
articles were written prior to his confirmation discussing
Kennedy"s middle of the road attitudes. Now that Kennedy has
1 Williams, The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy
No Time for Ideology, 74 A.B.A.,J. 56 (1988).

2 lb1d.
3 lb1d.
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been on the Court for more than one term, it is possible to
asses wether he is a middle-of-the-road Justice. Kennedy is
not a middle-of-the-road judge. Kennedy is very much a
conservative Justice who sees the Constitution as a document
of principles to be strictly adhered to, and who sees the
role.of a judge as a non-activist. These conclusions were
drawn after reading his majority opinions, his concurring
opinions, and his dissenting opinions for the 1988 and 1989
Court Terms. Some of his more important appellate decisions
were mentioned by authorities in articles written after his
nomination to the Court. Those decisions will also be
analyzed in this paper. . There are over 400 opinions
authored by Kennedy since his appointment to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court;
therefore, only a small number of them will be analyzed for
this paper.
The paper is divided into two parts. The first part is
devoted to statutory interpretation. In this section, I will
analyze cases questioning the validity or application of
statutes or regulations. The second section centers on
constitutional interpretation. Within this section, I will
explain how Kennedy sees the role of the judge. In addition,
I will analyze some cases involving issues of constitutional
interpretation. Finally, I will analyze some of the pre
confirmation articles that speculated about his behavior on
the Court.
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
INTRODUCTION
There are maxims of self restraint governing
constitutional as well as statutory interpretation. Five
such maxims will be discussed and applied to Kennedy"s
interpretation of statutory questions"
First, many of the cases or controversies that reach
the Supreme Court are decided on statutory grounds rather
than constitutional grounds. This is a maxim of self
restraint. 4 " (I)f a case or controversy can be decided on
any other (grounds) than constitutional grounds-- such as
statutory construction, which constitutes the greatest
single area of the Court"s work, ... --the Court will be eager
to do so. " 5
Another maxim was articulated in an article written by
Louis Fisher. 6 "A more reliable safeguard against judicial
activism is the Court"s ability to sidestep sensitive issues
or decide in such a way as to allow the other branches and
state governments to re-enter the field and make the
necessary adjustments and revisions to the court
doctrine." 7

4 Henry J. Abraham, ed., The Judicial Process (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 386.

5 lllld.
6 Fisher. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation:
The Limits of Original Intent. 18 CUMB. L. REV.
67 (1987/1988).

7 lllld.
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In addition to these maxims there are others that also
deal with statutory interpretation. "If the court does find
that it must hold a law unconstitutional, it will usually
try hard to confine the holding to that particular section
of the statute

which was successfully challenged." 8 "In

any event, the Court will not normally formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied." 9
Another maxim is, "In the event of a val idi ty
challenged statute, the presumption of its constitutionality
is always in its favor." 10 In other words, the piece of
legislation will always be considered constitutional unless
the challenging party can prove otherwise.
Finally, Justices who read the exact wording of a
statute are exhibiting another form of judicial self
restraint. They use a rule called the "plain meaning". The
answer' to the case or controversy can most often be found in
the plain meaning of the statute without necessarily looking
at legislative intent.
"Where its words are plain, clear and determinate,
they require no interpretation .... Where the words
admit of two senses, each of which is conformable
to general usage, that sense is to. adopted, which
without departing from the literal import of the
words,
best
harlllOnizes with
the
nature
and
objectives,
the
scope
and
design
of
the
instrument.' 11
8 Abraham, Tbe Judicial Process, p. 389.
9 .l.b.iJi., p. 386.
10 .l.b.iJi., p. 385.
11 Sheldon Goldman, and Austin Sarat, eds., American
Court Systems' Readings in Judicial Procedure and
Behavior (White Plains, New York: Longman Inc.,
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Justice Kennedy most definitely uses the plain meaning rule
along with other maxims of self-restraint. Two opinions,
though, clearly exemplify the plain meaning

reasoning. They

are K-Mart v. Cartier, 108 S.Ct. 1811 (1988), and Patterson
v. McLean, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).

Decisions
In K-Mart v. Cartier

the Court had to determine the

validity of Customs Service Regulation 19 CFR sections
133.21(c)(1)-(3). This section of a 1987 regulation outlined
instances when section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act were not
applicable. Kennedy reasoned that sections (c) (1),(2) did
not violate section 536 of the Tariff Act because it
resolved statutory ambiguity in such words as "owned by" and
"merchandise of foreign manufacture". 12 It is apparent from
the opinion that if a subsection of a later or different act
clarifies the original act, and it does not directly change
the plain meaning of the act, it is not overruled. In this
case, however, a section of the Customs Service Regulation
was

found contradictory to the original section of the

Tariff Act. 19 CFR section 133.21 (c)(3) directly
contradicted "gray market strategies" prohibited by the
Tariff Act and it was held violative of the Tariff Act.
Here, the holding of only a particular section of a statute

1989), p. 587.
12 108 S.Ct. at 1811.
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in violation of the original act regulating that area of
commerce represents a maxim of self-restraint.
An article in the Los Angeles Daily Journal examined
Kennedy's opinion in K-Mart y. Cartier. The author correctly
pointed out that Kennedy used a doctrine, ..... that the
plain meaning of a statute or regulation governs, virtually
regardless of legislative purpose and practical impact," 13
In Patterson v. McLean Kennedy avoided a potential
constitutional question involving racial discrimination in
the dismissing of employees by looking only to the very
specific section brought to the attention of the court by
the parties. The parties to the case raised the question
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1981. The petitioner, a black
woman, ctaimed that she was not promoted to accountant clerk
solely because of her race. She brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
section 1981. The Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S.Ct. 2586
(1976), previously held that in the making of contracts race
could not be a factor under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court's majority, reasoned that in
Patterson y. McLean the continuing of contracts should have
been brought up under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and not section 1981 because the code deals only with the
making of contracts, not the continuing or breaking of
contracts. This opinion is an example of the plain meaning
13 Louis B. Schwartz, "Kennedy: The Newest Justice Stakes
Out His Position: The 'Gray Market' Case 'Plain
Meaning' And Other Potents," r,os Ange 1 es Da i 1 y
Journal, 30 Sept 1988, p. 3.
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rule and of the maxim confining statutory questions to the
precise issues presented.
In other cases Kennedy also reached questions of
statutory interpretation. Bethesda Hosp. Ass"n v. Bowen, 108
S.Ct. 1255 (1988), was the first opinion written by Kennedy
for the Court. This case dealt with the authority of a
review board to hear a case concerning a 1979 Medicare
regulation disallowing certain claims for malpractice
insurance premium costs. Kennedy held that the plain
language of the statute states that the review board had the
authority to hear claims against regulations. 14 Kennedy in
this case preferred to let the review board decide the issue
in keeping with the second maxim of self-restraint, which is
to allow other branches of the government to decide the
issue or to make necessary changes.
In the same article in the Los Angeles Dailv Journal
the author questioned the validity of answering questions
solely on the plain language of the statute or regulation
because in Bethesda no substantive or practical significance
of the controversy was discussed. 15 The issue was far too
technical an issue according to the author. This path taken
by Kennedy was extremely self-restraintist in nature.
Because he does not see himself or the role of judge in
general as appropriately being activist, a narrow statutory
issue was decided.
14 108 S.Ct. at 1257.
15 Fisher, "Methods of Constitutional Interpretation," p. 4.
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Occasionally Kennedy will look to legislative history
to help resolve any question not readily resolvable by the
language of the statute alone. There are two such cases. In
the first, Public Employee Retirement System of Ohio v.
Butts, 109 S.Ct. 2854 (1989), the respondent claimed that a
requirement that anyone receiving disability benefits be
under the age of 60 violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Kennedy writing for the majority, looked to
the legislative intent of the act. Its purpose was to
prohibit age as a factor for hiring, firing, and wages and
salaries. As long as the Ohio retirement plan did not
deceive the Age Discrimination in Employment Act on its
fac~,

reasoned Kennedy, the insurance, retirement, and

disability plans were exempt from the prohibitions of the
A.D.E.A.
In another case Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 109
S.Ct. 468 (1988), Kennedy used legislative intent to
determine that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
did not have the power to impose retroactive cost
limitations on reimbursements for Medicare. The plain
language of the statute giving power to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services was looked at first, and then as a
last resort the legislative intent.
The best example of Kennedy's willingness to sidestep a
major constitutional issue in favor of a narrow statutory
issue is Topic v. Circle Reality, 532 F2d. 1273 (9th Cir.
1976). Kennedy wrote for the majority in this case from the

10

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A citizens action
group brought suit against the reality company for steering
whites and blacks into separate neighborhoods on the basis
of race. The citizens group brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
section 3612. Kennedy held that these people were third
party complainants because they were not directly effected
themselves and because they were not home buyers, but
rather, homeowners. Kennedy admitted that racial steering is
illegal, but section 3612 is not the proper section to
"vindicate the rights of third parties". 16 Kennedy
explained that section 3610 "permits suit by any person who
claims to have been injured by a discriminatory

housing

practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured
by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to
occur." 17 The fact that Kennedy distinguished between
sectio~

3612 and section 3610 after conceding that racial

steering is illegal best exemplifies his judicial self
restraint posture.

- /.

SUMMARY
Justice Kennedy clearly maintains a posture of judicial
self restraint in statutory interpretation. If the code or
statute is clearly written, or if a subsequent code or
statute to a previous code or statute clarifies, the plain
meaning of the exact words will be used to resolve the
issue. Only in rare instances does he look to legislative
16 532 F2d. 1275 (9th Cir. 1976).
17 532 F2d. at 1275.
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intent. This is in keeping with his overall view of the role
of judge. The judge should apply the rules or principles and
not use much judicial discretion. The problem with this mode
of interpretation is that,"[eJven the most carefully drafted
legislation has gaps." 18

18 Richard A. Posner, "What Am 17. A Potted Plant? The Case
Against Strict Constructionism", The New Republic,
Sept 28 1987, p. 24.
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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION

Since Marbury y

MadisQn, the dQctrine Qf judicial

review has been used tQ judge the cQnstitutiQnality of
legislatiQn Qr actiQns. Each justice has a view abQut the
use Qf judicial review. Generally there are three approaches
tQ cQnstitutiQnal interpretatiQn. 19 They are absQlutism,
balancing Qf interests, and preferred freedQms.
Absolutists believe Qnly the words Qf the CQnstitution
Qr an amendment can be used tQ determine cQnstitutiQnality.
Other schQlars have referred to them as

literalists or

textualists. 20 These peQPle also use the Qriginal intent of
the framers tQ help guide their opiniQns. They can be either
activist Qr restraintist in nature. Justice Black was an
avid absolutist and an activist on the Warren CQUrt. 21
Then there are those whQ when faced with a
cQnstitutional question balance the interests of the
gQvernment against the interests Qf the individual. These
jurists are said tQ be interest balancers. 22 Interest
balancers feel that, "although they have accepted the
premise that the CQurts are political institutiQns, they
19 Craig Ducat, and Harold W. Chase, ConstitutiQnal
InterpretatiQn (St. Paul, Minn: West Pub CQ.,
1988), p. 57.
20 Cole. Constitutional InterpretatiQn: A Bicentennial
ReflectiQn. 18 CUMB. L. REV. 13 (1987/1988).
21 Ducat, CQnstitutiQnal InterpretatiQn, p. 57.
22 !hid., p. 61.
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feel bound by the fundamental assumption that public policy
ought to be expressed through the actions of elected
officials." 23 These judges, therefore, take a self
restraintist position. 24
Preferred freedoms is a third approach to
constitutional interpretation. Jurists following this
approach believe that some rights are fundamental to a
democratic system of government. These people take into
account that there are permanent and unprotected minorities,
that the Constitution needs to be flexible to deal with an
ever changing world, and that the interests of the
individual always come before the government unless the
government can prove otherwise. 25 This position is clearly
activist.

"Precisely because the Court is not a majoritarian

institution, it has a constitutional responsibility to
carefully scrutinize majority passed legislation that
directly impinges upon the exercise of those rights by
minorities through which their political demands can be
expressed." 26
If a justice of the Supreme Court has an ideology that
he/she is comfortable with it may run contrary to an
existing doctrine or precedent. For example, a justice who
is an absolutist, and who sees the establishment clause of
the first amendment merely as a prohibition against
23
24
25
26

.I.b.id.
.I.b.id.
.I.b.id., p. 67.
.I.b.id.
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governmentally established state religion will run head on
into opinions that see the establishment clause as a barrier
to any governmental contact with any religion. Justices with
differing views of jurisprudence have effected many judicial
doctrines and legal concepts by expressing these views in
their opinions. Justices are, however, bound by stare
decisis. This to some extent, determines how a case should
be decided.
Although Justice Kennedy sees himself as a literalist
and the role of judge as a self-restraintist, his opinions
are those of a judge who balances interests. At first it may
seem odd, but one has to look at the precedent with which he
has to work. The Warren court was more activist in nature
than the court on which he now sits appears to be. Kennedy
has to work within the existing legal norms, but he can
distinguish cases from one another, or he can, for example,
find compelling government interests to regulate activity
not previously regulated. This clearly explains the
difference between the speeches he has given about his
judicial philosophy and some of his actual opinions.

HIS OWN VIEWS
"The first critical assumption (of judicial
absolutists) is that the Constitution is a collection of
rules." 27 In 1987 a legal newspaper ran two articles which
were essentially speeches that Kennedy had given about his
27 llUd., p. 57.
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view of jurisprudence sometime before his appointment to the
Supreme Court. In the first article entitled "Wise
Restraint,s Make Us Free", Justice Kennedy explained, "( t )he
whole idea of a written Constitution is that there must be
some fixed principles, some immutable laws, some constraints
that apply from one generation to the next .... And therefore
it"s necessary to develop a theory of constitutional
interpretation that respects that intention and that
confines the judiciary." 28 In another article published

•
about a month later Kennedy said, "To recognize the
necessity of continued interpretation does not give us a
license to interpret the document for utilitarian
ends .... The Constitution cannot be divorced from its logic
and its language, the intention of its framers, the
precedents of the law, and the historic values of our
people." 29 Kennedy feels that, " ... (T)he actual text can
settle more cases than its given credit for." 30 He goes on
to say that if the answer is not within the actual text then
the original intent of the Framers needs to be used. 31 In
addition to being a literalist, Kennedy is a conservative.
Kennedy is a judicial conservative who respects
precedent and the dangers of pursuing abstract philosophical
agendas. 32 Kennedy himself stated, "It"s a fundamental
28 "Judge Kennedy: "Wise Restraints Make Us Free," Legal
Times, 16 Nov., 1987, p. 14.
29 "Change But Not For The Sake of Change," Legal Times,
7 Dec., 1987, p. 21.
30 lh1.d.
31 lh1.d,
32 Peter Schrang, "'Webster" Could Answer Many Questions

16

misconception, though, to say that conservatives oppose
change. To the contrary, conservatives have an acute
awareness of the necessity for change. They simply do not
embrace it for its· own sake." 33 The absolutist approach can
be either activist or restraintist in nature; therefore it
is important to note Kennedy's conservative political
position. It is the reason Kennedy articulates in his
speeches that he chooses the restraintist absolutist
position,
A review of his opinions, however, seem not to be
literalist at all.

In fact, they seem to be balancing the

interests of the government versus the interests of the
individual. The exception appears to be his concurring
opinion in Texas V, Johnson, 109 S,Ct, 2533 (1989). Because
the balancing of interests approach is a self-restraintist
position, he is comfortable with this approach when the
absolutist position cannot be used.

Decisions
Kennedy's most striking examples of this balancing
approach is in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
109 S.Ct. 1402 (1989) and National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1354 (1989). The Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executiyes Ass'n opinion authorizes the Federal
Railroad Administration to mandatorally test employees for
About Kennedy," Los Angeles Daily Journal, 28 Ap.,
1989, p. 4.
33 "Change", p. 21.
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drug use under specified serious accidents or safety
violations. Justice Kennedy explains that although drug
testing through blood samples and urine tests is a "search"
under the fourth amendment, the government agents conducting
the testing do not need probable cause, nor do they need a
sear'ch war'rant. Kennedy reasoned, "For the Fourth Amendment
does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those
that are unreasonable." 34 Rule "G" that had allowed workers
to identify possible dr'ug use and abuse did very little to
eradicate the problems created by drug use in the railroad
industry; ther'efore, the gover'nment had enough of a
compelling interest in regulating the railr'oads for the
safety of all those involved, according to the Court. The
government in these circumstances can use the threat of drug
testing as a deterrent to future drug use in the industry.
This case was decided along with another mandatory drug
testing case.
In National Treasur'Y Employees Union y. Von Raab,
D.E.A. agents ar'e automatically tested for drug use when
they are promoted to positions that deal directly with .
interdiction of illegal drug trafficking, or that require
agents to carry firearms within the Drug Enforcement Agency.
The compelling interest of the gover'nment to fight the drug
war far out weighed the interests of the individuals.
(w)hen a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance

--------

34 109 S.Ct. at 1414.
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the individual's privacy expectations against the
government's interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized
suspicion
in
the
particular
context. 35
There is no need for a showing that there be a history of
drug use by the agents; it is enough that they work in
sensitive areas of drug enforcement.
Kennedy, in three cases that questioned criminal
procedure, ruled in favor of the government. The petitioner
in Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 108 S.Ct. 2369 (1988),
claimed the district court had erred when it threw out grand
jury indictments on the grounds that the rules of federal
procedure were violated causing the defendants a harmful and
prejudiced effect in the grand jury proceedings. Kennedy
agreed that the district court had erred because the rules
that were violated were not substantial enough to harm or
prejudice the grand jury. In another case, U.S. v. Broce,
109 S.Ct. 757 (1989), the respondents pleaded guilty to two
counts of conspiracy, and subsequently were found guilty.
They contended that the conviction should be set aside
because in fact it was one incident of conspiracy;
therefore, the double count violated guarantees against
double jeopardy. Kennedy allowed the conviction to stand
because they admitted their guilt to two crimes in a
confession to police, and because they pleaded guilty to two
counts of conspiracy. Kennedy wrote on another double
jeopardy case from Missouri, Jones v. Thomas, 109 S.Ct. 2522
35 109 S.Ct. at 1390.
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(1989). Tpe petitioner was sentenced for two felonies as a
result of one crime; however, under Missouri law a defendant
can only be sentenced for one. The governor commuted the
lesser sentence and the time already served was subtracted
from the existing sentence. The petitioner filed for a

~

of habeas corpus. Kennedy held that because the error was
realized, and because time was subtracted from the existing
sentence, there was no showing of a double jeopardy
violation.
In a dissenting opinion with Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Kennedy distinguishes Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093
(1988) from the Miranda'ruling. Kennedy reasoned that if a
suspect is read his Miranda rights and refuses to talk to
police until his lawyer is present and a second
investigation from a different crime brings police to
question the suspect while in police custody, he must again
waive his right to talk until his lawyer is present. In
other words, all questioning for any crime is not halted
when a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, only the
questioning for the crime for which his Miranda rights

were

read. "Allowing authorities who conduct a separate
investigation to read the suspect his Miranda rights and ask
him wether he wishes to invoke them strikes an appropriate
balance, which protects the suspect"s freedom from coercion
without unnecessarily disrupting legitimate law enforcement
efforts." 36 The author of a Laa Ange 1 es Dal IV .Journal
36 108 S.Ct. at 2103.
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article expressed, "Kennedy's Roberson dissent with
Rehnquist manifests a disposition to overrule Miranda, and a
readiness to abandon 'plain meaning' interpretation when
" 'C',:,,'such"interpretation ,runs counter to strongly held policy
references." 37 This opinion partly overstated Kennedy's
dissent in this case. Kennedy refused to extend Miranda
beyond its original scope by distinguishing it from other
cases, rather than a disposition to overrule it all
together. This was in keeping with Kennedy's self
restraintist position to refuse to extend the facts of one
case beyond those of the original case. "The technique of
restricting a precedent to a narrow range enables a judge to
depart, in a sense, from prior rulings without defying or
... overturning them." 38 Kennedy was clearly interested in
protecting the individuals interests which would not lead to
a conclusion that he is willing to overrule Miranda all
together.
Two opinions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also exhibit Kennedy's balancing of interest
approach. In Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F2d. 788 (9th Cir.
1980), former sailors brought suit alleging that the Navy's
regulation which allows the dismissing of persons who admit
to homosexual activity violated the due process clause of
37 Louis B Scwartz,"Kennedy: The Newest Justice stakes His
Position: The 'Gray Market' Case, 'Plain Meaning', and
Other Portents," Los Angeles Daily Journal, 30 Sept.,
1988, p. 5.
38 Martin P Golding, Lega] Reasoning (New York NY:
Alfred A Knopf, 1984), p. 101.
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the Fifth Amendment. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. He
explained that the dismissals did not violate the fifth
amendment protection:
. :.

,.,

'

;

'""" """'We"are"limited"to"determining whether or not the
Constitution prohibits the Navy from adopting the
rule before us. We cannot say that constitutional
limitations
have
been
exceeded
here,
and
therefore h we do not find the regulation is
invalid . .::l9
Kennedy refused to come to a conclusion of whether
homosexual activity is a fundamental right of privacy. "We
decide at the outset that this case does not require us to
address the question whether consensual private homosexual
conduct is a fundamental right .... " 40 Kennedy, like in the
Arizona y. Roberson dissent, applied the principle of stare
decisis. Kennedy explained,
Recent decisions indicate that substantive due
process scrutiny of
a
government
regulation
involves a case-by-case balancing of the nature of
the individual interest allegedly infringed, the
importance of the government interests furthered,
the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of
the
government
entity
responsible
for
the
regulation to more carefully tailored alternative
means of achieving its goals. 41
Kennedy finally held:
We conclude, in these cases, that the importance
of the government interests furthered, and to some
extent the relative impracticality at this time of
achieving the Government' s goals by regulations
which turn more precisely on the facts of an
individual case, outweigh whatever heightened
solicitude is appropriate for consensual private
homosexual conduct. 42

39
40
41
42

632 F2d. at 792.
632 F2d. at 807.
l.b.i.d.
l.b.i.d.
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Kennedy felt that the fact that it was the Navy which was
the employer in this case was crucial to his decision
because he wrote, ': ... that some kinds of governmental
~

. .'.-;... ..

..'

.

regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may
(emphasis added) face substantial constitutional
challenge."43 .
Another example of the balancing of interests approach
is apparent in a case from the court of appeals for the
Ninth Circuit involving pay differences between jobs held by
men and women within the Washington state governnlent. In
addition to the words of the law, Kennedy looked to
legislative intent as well to help decide the case. The
American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees
brought suit against the state of Washington in AFSCME v.
State of Washington, 770 F2d. 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). It
alleged that Washington paid its women workers less for jobs
of comparable worth to men in violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Kennedy held that
While the Washington legislature may have the
discretion to enact a comparable worth plan if it
chooses to do so, Title VII does not obligate it
to eliminate an economic inequality it did not
create .... We find nothing in the language of Title
VII
or
its
legislative
history to
indicate
Congress intended to abrogate fundamental economic
principles such as the laws of supply and demand
or to prevent employers from competing in the
labor market. 44
While Kennedy was on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, he wrote an insightful case demonstrating his
43 lhid.
44 770 F2d. at 1407.
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literalist approach to jurisprudence. In 1980, a case came
before the Court of Appeals concerning a congressional veto
.

,";

"

-

,'.,.

over ruling an Immigration and Naturalization Service
.',

..

'....

. .... '

.'

finding. In Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 634 F2d. 408 (9th Cir. 1980), Kennedy held that
statute unconstitutional. The statute gave Congress a one
house legislative veto over ruling an agency finding. The
veto violated the doctrine of separation of powers
established by the Constitution, because the INS is
-essentially an agency of the executive branch. Kennedy
wrote, the veto is an " assUmption of power ... both
disruptive and unnecessary to the attainment of a legitimate
purpose." 45 Kennedy feels very strongly that each branch of
government stay with in its constitutional mandate. This
opinion falls with in his literalist approach toward
constitutional interpretation. The concurring opinion
written for the controversial flag burning case, Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1988), also exhibits this position.
For we are presented with a clear and simple
statute to be judged against a pure command of the
Constitution .... The hard fact is that sometimes we
must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that
the law and the Constitution, as we see them,
compel the result .... With all respect to those
views, (of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices White
and O'Connor dissenting) I do not believe the
Constitution gives us the right to rule as the
dissenting members of the Court urge, however this
judgement is to announce .... the fact remains that

45 634 F2d. at 409.
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his acts were speech, in both the technical and
the fundamental meaning of the Constitution. 46
In a somewhat different but related vain, Thomas Grey in a
1975 law review article articulated the sentiments written
by Kennedy in his concurring opinion .
.......•. ,...• '..,,'

: ,•. "::,i.,:.,." .! : " ..•..•'

'''''':''';''(W'jhen'' the-·cQurt'"etrikes·· down' a:'popular statute
or practice as unconstitutional, it may always
reply to the resulting public outcry: 'We didn't
do it
you did.' The people have chosen the
principles that the statute or practice violated,
have designated it as fundamental,
and have
written it down in the text of the Constitution
for the judges to interpret and apply.47

Justice Kennedy said just that to the other members of the
Court, and to that part of the public that is offended by
flag burning.

SUMMARY
Many Supreme Court watchers speculated that Kennedy
would be a middle-of-the-road justice. This could not be
more untrue. Today as well as his past years on the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy is not a
middle-of-the-road justice. When he can, he is an
absolutist. Often, though, the Court has in preceding
decisions established a framework within which he must work.
When those cases arise, Kennedy will balance the interests
in a position of self-restraint most comfortable to him.·One
author wrote that although justices actin a self
restraintist manor their acts may actually be activist in
46 109 S.Ct. at 2548.
47 Grey. Do We Haye an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L.
REV. 705 (1975).
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nature. 48 This is precisely what Justice Kennedy's opinions
during his initial tenure appear to do. He takes the
restraintist position to achieve activist ends, Whether he
actually wants to achieve activist ends with his restaintist

research.

48 Ely. Constitutional Interpretiyism:Its Allure
and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977/1978).
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CONCLUSIONS
Some the works of Anthony M. Kennedy have been used to
analyze his decisions, and the conclusions drawn here are
not the same as those offered by some journalists and
, '"

,., .. ',.'

.'

... , ':'scholars';" Many of these authorities thought they knew his
behavior, but they did not. The first such article was
published in December 1987. It explained that unlike Bork,
Kennedy appeared to be a middle-of-the-road judge. "In less
strident tones, he declared that he has no fixed views on
abortion, the limitations on privacy rights, or the death
penalty, and he described hiB growing sensitivity to race
and gender discrimination." 49 Charles Williams stated,
'"
despite having written more than 430 opinions
during his 12 years on the 9th Circuit, and
despite having undergone questioning by the same
Senate
Judiciary Committee
that
meticulously
dissected Bork, no one knows how a Justice Kennedy
would treat the most sensitive issues of our day:
civil rights, women"s rights and the right to
privacy.
50
A year and a half later, however, journalists and scholars
seem to backing away from their earlier position.
A year later seasoned courtwatchers say Supreme
Court
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy is still far
from a judicial certainty. But, he appears to have
aligned himself firmly with the Courts more
conservative justices, bringing the high court its
first working conservative majority in decades. 51

----------

49 Charles Roberts, "Kennedy Promises Law And Order As
Hearings Begin: High Court Nominee Says No Fixed Views
On Abortion, Privacy: Polite Give And Take," LQ.a
Angeles Daily Journal, 15 Dec., 1987, p. 1.
50 Williams, " The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy," p. 56.
51 Richard A Reuben, " After One Year Kennedy Still
A Mystery Man: Seems To Side With Conservative Wing,
But Still Very Early: Liberals Hopeful," LQ.a
Angeles Daily Journal, 7 Ap., 1989, p. 1.
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Kennedy is clearly a conservative justice who will in
most instances go the conservative route. There will be
fewer sweeping cases like Brown v

Board or Miranda v'

Arizona giving citizens rights they did not know they had,

:'...-::,«, "''''''''''':;'but' fn'l;i'Yiil'i('t"o' riei'tdct' 'ail"ch'decii3i6b'~,the'Court,'thanks
to Justice Kennedy, may be more activist than it has been in
years.

Kennedy said he felt proud that his name will appear
on the same water goblet as Justice Powell and Justice
Black. 52 A scholar, in a soon to be published article,
interpreted that statement. "He was impressed that his water
goblet is the, same used by a favorite former justice, Hugo
Black,53 One author wrote of Justice Black:
Throughout his long and remarkable career on the
bench, the most consistently reiterated theme of
his constitutional jurisprudence was the need for
fidelity to the constitutional text in judicial
review, and the illegitimacy of constitutional
doctrines based on sources other that the explicit
commands of the written Constitution. 54
This perception of jurisprudence is plainly articulated
in Kennedy's own speeches outlining his jurisprudence. He
stated that he prefers the "textual approach" in cases
involving constitutional and statutory interpretation

52 24 The Docet Sheet of The Supreme Court of the United
States, Winter 1988, at 1, col. 1
53 Melone, "Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: The
First Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy,"
(Paper submitted to American Judicature Society, Spring
1990) .
54 Grey, Do We Have, p. 703.
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cases. 55 The only real difference from what Kennedy has
said and from what was written about Black is that Kennedy
will use the absolutist aPproach in a restraintist rather
than activist manor. As Kennedy feels more at home in the

",':'"."", ""':"'SUp"i';';m~"'t<;uj;"t'thamber8more""de:6ieii6ns

lik'eTOPIC and Chadha ;

which demonstrate most clearly a literalist approach to
jurisprudence may be handed down.

55 "Wise Restraints," p. 4.
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